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The processes involved in analogy solving have been an important investigative area in 
cognitive psychology. Although problem restructuring has been a central construct in problem 
solving theory, no restructuring processes have been proposed for analogical reasoning. Yet, 
the stimulus terms for analogies, as they appear on ability tests, are often ill-structured. 
That is, they are ordered in a way that does not permit direct problem comprehension. 
In the current study, both perceptual and semantic problem restructuring processes were 
hypothesized for analogy solving. The independence, stage of execution, and susceptibility to 
strategic control of the two processes were examined. The results from two experiments 
indicated that (1) ill-structured analogies are restructured during problem solving, (2) perceptual 
and semantic restructuring processes are independent and executed at different stages of 
analogy solving, and (3) both processes exhibited automaticity since repetition of analogy 
solution attenuated but did not eliminate either restructuring process. A model of analogical 
reasoning that incorporated both restructuring processes and their execution sequences was 
proposed. The nature and automaticity of perceptual and semantic analogy restructuring 
processes were disscussed. 
Verbal analogies have been an intriguing problem 
solving task in cognitive psychology research. This is 
indicated by the several models of problem solving 
processes for analogies that have been examined 
(Pellegrino & Glaser, 1980; Reitman, 1965; Rumelhart 
& Abrahamson, 1973; Spearman, 1923; Sternberg, 
1977a; Whitely & Barnes, 1979). Several features of 
analogies contribute to their popularity for study. First, 
verbal analogies are semantically rich problems requir-
ing the education, production, and evaluation of word 
pair relationships. Second, verbal analogies are reasonably 
well-structured problems that are suited to stage analysis 
because the solution must fulfill a set of specified 
constraints. These constraints include the size of the 
alternative set and a restricted set of possible semantic 
relationships (Whitely, 1977). Third, since analogy 
items have the greatest saturation on the general intelli-
gence factor that is common among intelligence tests 
(McNemar, 1964), they can be used to model individual 
differences from information processing components of 
human intelligence. An example of such an attempt is 
Sternberg's (1977a) componential theory of analogical 
reasoning. Fourth, modeling procedural aspects of 
human intelligence also has heuristic impact for artificial 
intelligence (Evans, 1968; Hayes-Roth & McDermott, 
1978; Reitman, 1965). 
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Consider the prototypic structure of an analogy: 
A : B : : C • 	? [stem] 
X1 X2 X3 X4 
	
[alternatives] 
The order of the elements in the stem conveys implicit 
problem-defining information. The analogy problem is 
read. "A is to B as C is to some unknown. What alter-
native has the same relationship with C as A has with 
B?" 
Sternberg (1977a, 1977b) has proposed a detailed 
model that incorporates six information processing 
components: encoding, inference, mapping, application, 
justification, and preparation-response. Two of these 
processes, preparation-response and encoding, concern 
relationships between the physical stimulus and an 
internal representation of the problem. Preparation-
response is a motor process that represents the solver's 
orientation to the problem and the response output. 
Encoding is the construction of an internal representa-
tion of the analogy terms from the physical stimuli. 
The remaining processes elaborate, or modify, the 
current problem representation. Inference and mapping 
processes determine the A: B and A : C stem relations, 
respectively. Application uses the mapping relationship 
to extend the domain (inference) of the analogy to its 
range (C term and alternatives) and determines possible 
answers. Justification, an optional process, is used to 
decide among competing alternatives, if necessary. 
Encoding and preparation-response are exhaustively 
executed. The other processes may be executed in either 
a self-terminating or an exhaustive fashion. The initiali-
zation sequence of process execution is: preparation, 
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encoding, inference, mapping, application, justification, 
and response. With the exception of mapping, similar 
processes have been incorporated in previous analogical 
models (Evans, 1968; Johnson, 1962; Reitman, 1965; 
Rumelhart & Abrahamson, 1973; Spearman, 1923). 
Current models of analogical reasoning either assume 
that analogies are well-structured problems or ignore the 
issue. None of the previously mentioned models is 
directly applicable to ill-structured verbal analogies 
because they do not incorporate analogy restructuring 
processes. Ill-structured verbal analogies, however, often 
occur in aptitude measurement instruments and among 
some experimental analogy sets. For example, solve the 
following analogy, which is like many psychometric 
analogies: 
ROBIN : MUSTANG : : BIRD : __?_ 
LIZARD HORSE DOG FISH 
Clearly, this is a poorly structured version of the follow-
ing analogy: 
ROBIN : BIRD : : MUSTANG : __?_ 
LIZARD HORSE DOG FISH 
The well-structured domain and range of the example 
are: Specific Animal 1 (ROBIN) "is a member of Animal 
Category 1 (BIRD) as Specific Animal 2 (MUSTANG) 
"is a member of" Animal Category 2 (__?_). The 
ill-structured domain and range are: Specific Animal 1 
(ROBIN) "is an animal name as is" Specific Animal 2 
(MUSTANG) as Animal Category 1 (BIRD) "is an 
animal category name as is" Animal Category 2 
The domain of the ill-structured example cannot pro-
duce a selection rule between the alternatives; they are 
all animal categories. 
Although Sternberg (1977b, pp. 232-233) briefly 
addressed the issue of analogy ill-structure, he was 
unable to support the inclusion of a restructuring 
process in his componential model. Sternberg tested a 
variant model that utilized the strongest stem word 
pair relationship (either A: B or A: C) as the analogy 
domain and the weakest relationship as the mapping 
component. He was unable to obtain substantial differ-
ences between his preferred model and the variant 
model. It should also be noted that Sternberg presented 
a mix of ill-structured and well-structured analogies, but 
he did not compare both versions of the same analogies. 
Grudin (1980) has observed that several of Sternberg's 
ill-structured analogies were solved faster when presented 
as well-structured, prototypic analogies. Grudin con-
cluded that the A: C word pair relation was utilized as 
the domain when the A: B word pair relation was not 
applicable. However, the mapping component is not to 
be construed as a problem restructuring process. Barnes 
(Note 1) has obtained mapping latencies for true-false,  
but not for forced-choice, well-structured verbal 
analogies. 
If models of analogical reasoning are to be used to 
understand intelligence and link individual difference 
research with experimental cognitive research, then 
problem solving for well-structured and ill-structured 
analogies must be modeled. To accomplish this goal, 
models of analogical reasoning must postulate and 
investigate the role of problem restructuring processes. 
The purpose of the following discussion and two experi-
ments is to propose and examine the nature of two 
problem restructuring processes for analogies. Specific 
emphasis will be placed on their independence, stages 
of execution, and susceptibility to strategic control. 
Problem Restructuring Processes 
The restructuring of ill-structured problems has been 
an enduring and central construct in psychological 
models of human problem solving. Problem restructur-
ing concepts and mechanisms have been espoused by the 
Gestaltist (Duncker, 1945; Luchins, 1942), the associa-
tionist (Maltzman, 1955; Mednick, 1962), and the 
contemporary cognitive psychologist (Greeno, 1976; 
Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1973) traditions. Prob-
lem restructuring is a necessary construct because it 
postulates that the internal representation of problems 
can be changed in the course of problem solving to 
achieve solution. Generally, a problem is considered 
well-structured if all relevant information concerning 
the problem, the strategy needed, and the attributes of 
a successful solution are known by the solver. For well-
structured problems, the steps to solution are usually 
well-known and solution is primarily an algorithmic, 
or reproductive, sequence of problem solving processes 
(Greeno, 1973). Well-structured problems can be typi-
fied by protocols for solution strategy (Greeno, 1976; 
Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon & Reed, 1976). These 
protocols usually represent a strategy of working for-
ward from the initial state to a familiar goal state. Ill-
structured problems, on the other hand, do not have an 
explicit statement of the task environment. Likewise, 
the steps on the solution path and the attributes of a 
correct solution are not completely known as problem 
solving begins (Davis, 1973; Greeno, 1973; Simon, 
1973). Ill-structured problems are often solved by 
working backward from the goal to the current problem 
state. 
Although problem restructuring is a central construct 
in problem solving models, little experimental research 
has been devoted to understanding problem restructur-
ing as an information processing component. That is, 
problem restructuring processes have not been studied 
by comparing solution latencies for well-structured and 
ill-structured versions of the same problem. Rather, 
current problem solving research has (1) developed 
taxonomies of problem structures and problem solving 
processes (e.g., Davis, 1973; Greeno, 1973; Simon, 
'1973), (2) used protocol and means-ends analyses to 
develop information processing models of general 
problem solvers and strategies for solving problems (e.g., 
Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon & Reed, 1976), and 
(3) developed stage models for rapidly solved verbal 
problems (e.g., Clark & Chase, 1972; Potts & Scholz, 
1975; Sternberg, 1979). Similarly, research on verbal 
analogies has concerned a comparable range of topics, 
but, as yet, analogy restructuring processes have not 
been proposed or experimentally studied. 
Well-Structured and Ill-Structured Verbal Analogies 
Given the prototypic analogy structure and two 
transformational rules, three ill-structured versions of an 
analogy can be generated. The first transformation, 
structural, exchanges the B and the C terms in the 
analogy stem. The second transformation, directional, 
changes the direction of the analogy stem. 
Consider the following four versions of the same 
verbal analogy. The first problem is a prototypic, well-
structured analogy: 
DEEP : SHALLOW : : CHEAP : __?_ 
[ A:B::C:_] 
COSTLY, WIDE 
Application of the structural transformation produces a 
semantically ill-structured version of the analogy. In this 
version, the inference, mapping, and application com-
ponents of stem representation can be easily confused: 
DEEP : CHEAP : : SHALLOW : 	?_ 
A: C : :B:_ ] 
COSTLY, WIDE 
A perceptually ill-structured version of the analogy can 
be produced by applying the directional transformation 
to the prototypical analogy. In this version, the direction 
in which the analogy problem is initially encoded and 
internally represented is the reverse of the order of the 
relationships in the analogy stem: 
: CHEAP : : SHALLOW : DEEP 
_:C: :B :A ] 
COSTLY, WIDE 
The last ill-structured version is obtained by applying 
both structural and directional transformations to the 
prototypic analogy. The result is an analogy in which the 
direction of the initial stem encoding and the stem rela-
tionship eduction processes are poorly structured and 
OP possibly misunderstood: 
I
[_:B::C:A I 
The four versions of verbal analogy structure can be 
ceptualized as a fourfold table. The two dimensions 
: SHALLOW : : CHEAP : DEEP 
COSTLY, WIDE  
represent perceptual and semantic analogy structure. 
Both- dimensions have two values for analogy structures 
that do, or do not, require analogy restructuring, for 
example: 
Perceptually Restructure 
Restructure 	No 	 Yes 
No 	A:B::C:_ 	_:C::B:A 
Yes A:C::B:_ _:B::C:A 
Clearly, the above four verbal analogy structures are a 
subset of all possible ill-structured versions. They are, 
however, common forms of ill-structured verbal analogy 
stems. Thus, analogical restructuring processes applicable 
to the above three versions of analogy ill-structure 
should generalize to some degree to other versions of 
ill-structured analogies. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The first experiment examined the independence, 
susceptibility to strategic control, and stage of execu-
tion for both perceptual and semantic analogy restruc-
turing processes. Solution latencies and accuracy for the 
four structural versions of analogy problems were 
compared. In addition, each analogy in one of the four 
analogy structures was solved three times. 
Susceptibility to strategic control. Repetition was 
included in the design to determine if analogy restruc-
turing is either susceptible to strategic control or auto-
matically executed. With repetitive problem solving, 
subjects could adopt a solution recognition strategy 
and thus circumvent analogy restructuring processes. 
They would merely have to pair solutions with analogies 
regardless of the analogy's structure. Then, upon recog-
nition of the analogy, solution could be achieved by the 
simpler process of cued recall. 
Repetitive problem solving has been shown to reduce 
steps to solution (Simon & Reed, 1976). Thus repetitive 
problem solving was expected to make the problems 
more well-structured, since the solver presumably knew 
more about the necessary steps to achieve solution. 
Therefore, repetition should decrease solution latency 
and increase accuracy. 
The elimination of analogy restructuring with increas-
ing problem solving trials would suggest a strategy shift 
from problem solving to solution recognition. A failure 
to eliminate analogy restructuring effects by repetition 
would suggest that subsequent analogy restructuring 
processes are performed automatically. That is, analogy 
restructuring processes are always executed and are not 
subject to strategic control. The facilitation of analogy 
solving without the elimination of analogy restructuring 
effects with repetition would indicate a shift from 
productive to algorithmic problem solving. That is, 
with additional solution trials, the correct sequence of 
problem solving processes becomes learned, the solution 
Semantically 
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known, and analogy solving facilitated, although all 
processes are still performed. 
Stage of execution. Three analogical problem tasks 
were used to determine the stage of execution for both 
analogy restructuring processes. One analogy task pre-
sented an intact verbal analogy and required subjects to 
solve the problem. The other two problem tasks factored 
the analogy problem into an analogy stem task and an 
analogy solution task. The analogy stem task presented 
the analogy stem for study. The analogy solution task 
followed the analogy stem task and presented the 
alternatives with the stem for the analogy problem. The 
analogy was solved during the analogy solution task. 
Potts and Scholz (1975) used a similar set of tasks 
to examine the effects of task presentation on the 
internal representation for three-term series problems. 
They noted different internal representations for the 
three-term series problems if the problem question was 
presented simultaneously with the problem's premise 
(an intact task) or was presented separately (the decom-
posed task). The three problem tasks were used to 
examine the role the alternative set has on analogy 
restructuring. The analogy stem and analogy solution 
tasks separated the internal representation of the 
analogy's premise (stem) in the stem task from the 
production and evaluation of the solution in the analogy 
solution task. The analogy stem and solution tasks were 
similar to Sternberg's (1977a, 1977b) three-cue pre-
cuing and solution intervals, respectively. The intact 
task is comparable to Sternberg's solution interval for 
the zero-cue precuing condition. 
Restructuring hypotheses. The four structural ver-
sions of analogy problems were used to examine three 
analogy restructuring hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
was that response latencies attributable to semantic 
and perceptual analogy restructuring transformations 
could be obtained. Increased response latency for ill-
structured analogies would support problem restruc-
turing components in analogical reasoning. 
The second hypothesis was that the semantic and 
perceptual restructuring transformations represent sep-
arate processing stages. The latency, stage of execution, 
and accuracy for both restructuring processes were 
examined to test this hypothesis. Significant main 
effects for the latencies of both restructuring processes 
without a significant interaction would support their 
independence. Alternatively, an interaction would 
support a more general, non-transformation-specific 
restructuring stage. In addition, the latencies for both 
types of restructuring processes were compared by 
contrasting the A: C: : B:_ and the _: C: :B: A response 
times. 
Both restructuring processes were predicted to occur 
at different times in the course of problem solving and 
to have differential effects on solution accuracy. Per-
ceptual ill-structure was hypothesized to be immediately 
apparent, whereas semantic ill-structure was thought  
to be less discernible. The _: C: : B: A and the _:B: : C: A 
ill-structured analogies provide a perceptual trigger for 
analogy restructuring in the stem-blank position. When 
analogy solvers encode a blank as the first stem posi-
tion, they should be aware that the stem relationships 
have been reversed. Perceptual analogy restructuring 
was expected to manifest effects in the analogy stem 
task but not in the analogy solution task due to the 
stem-blank position. The A : C: :B:_ and the _ :B: : C: A 
analogy structures, on the other hand, do not provide 
a salient cue for semantic problem restructuring. Seman-
tic ill-structure within the stem components can be 
determined only by attempts to educe relationships. 
Apprehension of stem ill-structure is further confounded 
by the nature of the inference, mapping, and application 
components. That is, the need to semantically restruc-
ture can become apparent during stem processing, but it 
is more likely to be perceived as a result of unsuccessful 
application processing. Thus, semantic analogy restruc-
turing was expected to manifest effects in both the 
analogy stem and solution tasks. Since semantic restruc-
turing requires relationship eduction, failure to seman-
tically restructure an ill-structured analogy was expected 
to decrease solution accuracy. Conversely, perceptual 
analogy restructuring should be independent of accuracy 
due to its obvious perceptual trigger. 
The third hypothesis was that both the Perceptual 
Restructuring by Repetition and the Semantic Restruc-
turing by Repetition interactions would be significant. 
There were three possible interpretations of the two 
interactions. First, significant Restructuring by Repeti-
tion interactions, facilitation of analogy solving across 
repetition, and significant restructuring effects at all 
levels of repetition would indicate that both restructur-
ing processes were automatic and executed more 
efficiently (algorithmically) with repetition. Second, an 
interaction that results in the elimination of analogy 
restructuring effects across repetition would indicate a 
shift to a strategy in which restructuring need not occur 
(e.g., solution recognition). Third, no significant Restruc-
turing by Repetition interactions, with significant main 
effects for both restructuring processes, would indicate 
that the restructuring processes were automatically 
executed and were not facilitated by repetitive analogy 
solving. 
Method 
Subjects and Apparatus. Twenty-four subjects from a large 
state university in the Midwest participated in the experiment 
as a requirement of an introductory psychology course. The 
experimental stimuli were presented by slide projector. The 
projector light triggered a millisecond timer that was terminated 
by subject response. Responses and latencies were printed on 
paper tape as the experiment progressed. Individual subjects 
were tested in a 1-h session. Each subject responded to 64 
experimental analogies. This corresponded to eight analogies 
for each experimental condition. The experimental analogies 
came from an item bank calibrated by Whitely and Dawis (1976) 
to fit a test theory model. Forced-choice verbal analogies with 
two alternatives, as in the previous examples, were used. The 
correct answer was the first (left) or second (right) alternative 
half of the time for each position. Subjects solved the problem 
by throwing the response switch in the same direction as their 
chosen solution. If their chosen solution was the second alterna-
tive, they threw the switch to the right. 
Design. The experimental design was a 2 (intact or decom-
posed task) by 2 (perceptual structure) by 2 (semantic structure) 
by 3 (repetition of problem solving) within-subjects factorial. 
The three analogical problem tasks were analyzed separately. 
The two dependent variables, response time and response 
accuracy, were expected to be negatively correlated. To control 
for an expected speed-accuracy tradeoff, response latency was 
analyzed with accuracy as a covariate. Accuracy was analyzed 
in a separate univariate case. 
The order of the intact analogy and the decomposed analogy 
tasks (the analogy stem and solution tasks) was counterbalanced 
across subjects. Eight experimental analogies were arbitrarily 
assigned to one of eight groups, for a total of 64 analogies. Thus, 
there were eight problem solving trials (replications) for each 
experimental condition. The eight experimental conditions were 
counterbalanced across subjects. Each group of eight analogies 
was presented in every condition of analogy structure and • analogy problem task three times in the total data set. However, each subject solved the same set of experimental analogies in 
the same experimental conditions three times. All three analogy 
tasks were solved prior to the second repetition interval. 
Procedure. Subjects read an instruction sheet explaining the 
experiment as an investigation of the time it takes to represent 
and solve analogy problems. Analogies were explained with 
examples. The response options were explained to the subjects, 
along with a description of an experimental trial. Subjects 
responded to 16 practice trials prior to each of the initial prob-
lem tasks. 
For the analogy stem task, subjects were told to terminate 
presentation of the stem when they understood the problem 
by initiating a right response. The subject's response initiated 
the analogy solution task (presentation of the stem and alterna-
tives). The analogy solution task was terminated when the 
subject solved the problem. The subject's response to the intact 
analogy problem task terminated presentation of the problem. 
Subjects were able to initiate every trial by responding to a 
filler slide with "left" or "right" typed on it. This slide pre-
sented the correct response for the preceding analogy. Thus, 
subjects could monitor and adjust their ongoing speed-accuracy 
criterion. Subjects were instructed to respond as rapidly as 
possible while making few errors. 
Results 
The two dependent variables were response time and 
a log accuracy measure, Ln [P(correct)/P(error)] . As 
recommended by Pachella (1974), the log accuracy 
transformation was used to yield a more linear speed-
accuracy tradeoff. Geometric means were used to 
estimate a response time and an accuracy measure from 
the eight replications of each experimental condition. 
The distributions of response time and accuracy esti-
mated by geometric means were slightly less skewed 
and more mesokurtotic than the corresponding arith-
metic mean distributions. These estimates of response 
time and accuracy were the units of analysis. 
Response latency and accuracy were negatively 
Correlated over subjects for the three analogy problem 
tasks. The respective tradeoff correlations for the 
intact analogy, analogy stem, and solution tasks were:  
r = -.11, r = -.13, and r = -.13, with all probabili-
ties < .03 (n = 288). Thus response latency and accuracy 
were slightly related. Tables 1 and 2 depict the latency 
and accuracy means for perceptual and semantic restruc-
turing at each interval of repetition. Since the analogy 
stem task and solution task are portions of the same 
analogy problem, their accuracy is assessed only in the 
solution task. The average percent correct for the intact 
analogy task and the decomposed analogy tasks were 
88% and 89%, respectively. 
Table 1 
Response Latency Means (in Milliseconds Adjusted for Accuracy) 
for Repetitive Problem Restructuring in Three Analogical Tasks 
Restructuring Transformations 
No Perceptual 	Perceptual 
No 	 No 
Semantic Semantic Semantic Semantic 
A:B::C:_ A:C::B:_ _:C::B:A _:B::C:A Mean 
Intact Analogy Repetition 
1 5097 5403 5223 5796 5380 
2 2863 3239 3401 3546 3262 
3 2028 2147 2093 2463 2183 
Mean 3329 3596 3572 3935 
Analogy Stem Repetition 
1 4605 4838 4911 5223 4894 
2 2742 2867 3106 3272 2997 
3 1894 2246 2097 2150 2097 
Mean 3080 3317 3371 3549 
Analogy Solution Repetition 
1 1874 2221 1964 2042 2025 
2 1019 1254 1102 1166 1135 
3 684 835 766 828 778 
Mean 1192 1437 1277 1345 
Table 2 
Accuracy Means for Repetitive Problem Restructuring 
in Three Analogical Tasks 
Required Restructuring Processes 
No Perceptual 	Perceptual 
No 	 No 
Semantic Semantic Semantic Semantic 
A:B::C:_ A:C::B:_ _:C::B:A _:C::B:A Mean 
Intact Analogy Repetition 
1 
	
3.24 	2.32 	3.10 	3.03 	2.92 
2 3.95 2.41 4.16 4.09 3.65 
3 
	
5.06 	3.17 	4.05 	4.23 	4.13 
Mean 
	
4.08 2.63 3.77 3.78 
Analogy Stem and Solution Repetition 
1 
	
3.32 	2.63 	3.25 	2.85 	3.01 
2 4.60 2.95 4.29 3.47 3.83 
3 
	
5.63 	3.81 	4.42 	3.82 	4.42 
Mean 	4.52 3.13 3.99 3.38 
Note-Accuracy measure = Ln[P(correct)1P(error)J 
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Intact analogy task. Semantic and perceptual analogy 
restructuring effects were obtained for response latency 
in the intact analogy task. The significant F ratios 
were semantic, F(1,22) = 13.49 (p < .001), and per-
ceptual, F(1,22) = 17.12 (p < .001). Furthermore, 
repetition of the intact analogy task significantly 
decreased response latency [F(2,45) = 217.67, p < .001] . 
There were no significant interactions. 
For response accuracy, semantic and perceptual 
analogy restructuring significantly interacted [F(1,23) = 
5.00, p < .035] . The need to perceptually restructure 
an analogy attenuated the decremental effects of seman-
tic ill-structure for solution latency. Perceptual analogy 
restructuring did not affect accuracy. Semantic analogy 
restructuring yielded a marginal main effect for accuracy 
[F(1,23) = 3.63, p < .069] . Since failure to semantically 
restructure was predicted to decrease accuracy, this 
effect can be interpreted as a significant one-tailed t test 
[t(1,23) = 1.91, p < .05] . Repetition, as expected, sig-
nificantly increased accuracy [F(2,46)=837, p < .001] . 
Analogy stem task. A perceptual restructuring effect 
was obtained for response latency [F(1,22) = 8.22, 
p < .009] . Semantic restructuring, however, manifested 
a marginal effect [F(1,22) = 3.89, p < .061] . Again, a 
directional hypothesis was predicted, and this effect was 
interpreted as a significant one-tailed t test [t(1,22) = 
1.97, p < .05] . Repetition of the stem task significantly 
decreased response latency [F(2,45) = 46.47, p < .001] . 
A marginal Repetition by Perceptual Restructuring 
interaction [F(2,45) = 2.94, p < .064] indicated that 
repetition attenuated the perceptual restructuring 
latency. The least significant difference for the inter-
action was computed (268 msec; p < .05). The latencies 
attributable to perceptual restructuring processes for the 
three repetitions of the analogy stem task were 347, 
384, and 53 msec, respectively. Thus, significant latency 
differences were obtained for perceptual analogy restruc-
turing in the first two repetitions of the analogy stem 
task, but not in the third. Accuracy was not assessed in 
the stem task. 
Analogy solution task. A semantic restructuring 
effect was obtained for response latency in the solution 
task [F(1,22) = 5.28, p < .031] . Repetition again 
significantly decreased response latency [F(2,45) = 
61.56, p < .001] . Repetition significantly increased 
accuracy for the decomposed analogy tasks [F(2,46) = 
14.22, p < .001]. The requirement to semantically 
restructure an ill-structured analogy decreased accuracy 
[F(1,23) = 5.61, p < .027] . 
All other effects produced effect probabilities greater 
than 10 The response latencies for the intact analogy 
versions requiring a single but different restructuring 
process (i.e., the A : C: :B:_ and the _ :C: : B: A anal-
ogies) were not significantly different. Furthermore, 
the majority of subjects remarked that they were solving 
the same analogies repeatedly. Often the remarks com- 
mented on missing an analogy repeatedly or missing one 
that had previously been solved correctly. 
Discussion 
The data supported problem restructuring processes 
in verbal analogies. Analogies requiring either type of 
problem restructuring transformations took longer to 
solve than analogies not requiring that type of problem 
restructuring. In addition, the two restructuring processes 
were independent in their effects on response time. 
Further, the two processes were executed at different 
times in the sequence of solution steps. For the decom-
posed task, perceptual restructuring affected response 
time during the stem task but had no effect in the solu-
tion task. This supported the contention that perceptual 
restructuring was probably executed at analogy encoding 
time and completed before the application processes 
began. Semantic analogy restructuring significantly 
affected response time in both the analogy stem and 
solution tasks. Thus, semantic restructuring processes 
were apparently evoked by the initial relationship 
and generating processes as well as during the applica-
tion processes in the solution task. 
Accuracy at problem solving was also different for 
the two restructuring processes in the intact analogy 
task. Perceptual restructuring processes had no effect on 
accuracy, whereas semantic restructuring decreased 
solution accuracy. Most interesting, however, was the 
interaction of the two analogy restructuring processes 
for the intact analogy task. The requirement to both 
perceptually and semantically restructure an analogy 
attenuated the decremental effect of semantic ill-
structure. Prior perceptual restructuring of an analogy 
stem probably facilitates the recognition of semantic 
ill-structure. Perhaps the added stem processing time 
involved in perceptual restructuring enabled more 
exhaustive concurrent relationship eduction or increased 
the problem solver's sensitivity to analogy ill-structure. 
The failure to obtain either a significant Repetition 
by Perceptual Restructuring interaction in the intact 
and analogy solution tasks or a Repetition by Semantic 
Analogy Restructuring interaction in the three analogical 
tasks for response time was indicative of the automaticity 
of analogy restructuring. It appears that ill-structured 
analogies were restructured prior to problem solving, 
even though subjects knew they had repeatedly solved 
the same analogy in the same analogy structure. Interest-
ingly, subjects did not adopt the simpler solution recog-
nition strategy for the intact analogies. Thus, both 
analogy restructuring processes were automatically 
executed upon perception of ill-structure. It should be 
noted that this interpretation is based on the failure to 
reject the null hypothesis. 
Two results from the current study suggest that 
increased repetition might facilitate problem solving and 
thus attenuate both analogy restructuring latencies.  
111  First, there was a marginal Perceptual Restructuring by 
Repetition interaction for response time in the analogy 
stem task. Second, the latencies attributable to both 
analogy restructuring processes decreased descriptively 
with repetition in the intact and analogy stem tasks. 
While the present results clearly indicate that a solution 
recognition strategy was not adopted, increasing the 
number of repetition trials may facilitate a Repetition 
by Analogy Restructuring interaction. Furthermore, 
the nature of repetition can be changed so that analogy 
structure and repetition of problem solving are com-
pletely crossed within each subject. These two manip-
ulations may increase the likelihood of obtaining signif-
icant Analogy Restructuring by Repetition of Analogy 
Solving interactions, if they exist. Experiment 2 was 
performed to test these speculations. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The automaticity of both problem restructuring 
processes for solving ill-structured verbal analogies was 
further examined in the second experiment. As in 
Experiment 1, ill-structured analogies were thought to 
be restructured prior to problem solving. Both analogy 
restructuring transformations were expected to be 
independent and to increase solution latency. The 
( is purpose of the first experiment was to obtain support 
'w for semantic and perceptual analogy restructuring 
processes and to determine their stages of execution. 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the first 
experiment and to obtain a clear examination of the 
Repetition of Analogy Solving by Analogy Structure 
interaction. In the first experiment, repetition of prob-
lem solving and analogy structure were independent 
across analogies by counterbalancing in the full data set. 
However, analogy structure was not varied for each 
specific analogy that was presented. Rather, each analogy 
was repeatedly solved in the same analogy structure by 
the same solver. In Experiment 2, the same four versions 
of analogy structure were employed. However, each 
subject solved each analogy four times, once in each of 
its four structures. While the analogy terms and rela-
tionships were repeated, the structure of the analogy was 
not repeated. Thus, variance attributable to item differ-
ences was counterbalanced for each subject. All analogies 
were solved as intact analogies. 
As in Experiment 1, repetition of analogy solving 
was expected to facilitate analogy solving by making 
the solution process more algorithmic. Thus, the number 
of repetitions was increased to four and the type of 
repetition was changed in an attempt to obtain uncon-
founded and significant Repetition by Perceptual 
Restructuring and Repetition by Semantic Restructuring 
interactions. If significance were obtained, then con-
clusions about the automaticity of both analogy restruc-
turing processes would not be based on null hypothesis 
results. Given the results of the first experiment, repeti-
tion was expected to attenuate but not eliminate 
ANALOGY RESTRUCTURING 417 
latencies attributable to both types of problem restruc-
turing. 
Method 
Subjects and Apparatus. Thirty-two subjects from a large 
state university in the Midwest participated in the experiment 
as a requirement of an introductory psychology course. The 
same reaction time apparatus was used. Each subject solved 
48 experimental analogies. This corresponded to 12 replications 
of each problem structure. The 48 analogies were a subset of the 
analogies in the first experiment. In addition, the more difficult 
analogies in the first experiment were not used in the second 
experiment because solution latency, not accuracy, was of 
primary interest. 
Design and Procedure. The experimental design was a 2 (per-
ceptual structure) by 2 (semantic structure) by 4 (repetition of 
analogy solving) within-subjects factorial As in Experiment 1, 
ANCOVA was used, with response latency as the dependent mea-
sure and accuracy as the covariate. Accuracy was also analyzed 
in a separate univariate case. The four versions of the 48 analogies 
were put in four random orders, so that each problem version 
was in a different ordered set. The order of presentation for the 
four sets was counterbalanced across subjects. The instructions, 
response options, and procedure were the same as described 
for the first experiment. 
Results and Discussion 
Geometric means and a log accuracy measure were 
again calculated to estimate solution latency and 
accuracy, respectively, from the 12 replications. The 
response latency and accuracy estimates were the units 
of analysis. Solution latency and accuracy yielded a 
slight but significant speed-accuracy tradeoff (r = —.13, 
p < .001; n = 640). Tables 3 and 4 present the adjusted 
latency means and the accuracy means. The average 
percent correct was 85%. 
Repetition significantly decreased response latency 
[F(3,92) = 106.10, p < .001] and significantly increased 
accuracy [F(3,93) = 5.12, p < .003] . Perceptual restruc-
turing increased response latency [F(1,30) = 31.98, 
p < .001] . Semantic restructuring also increased response 
latency [F(1,30) = 29.25, p < .001] . 
Both the Perceptual Analogy Restructuring by 
Repetition and the Semantic Analogy Restructuring by 
Repetition interactions were significant for response 
latency. The F ratios were Perceptual by Repetition, 
Table 3 
Solution Latency Means (in Milliseconds Adjusted for Accuracy) 
for Repetitive Analogy Problem Solving 
Required Restructuring Processes 
No Perceptual 	Perceptual 
No 	 No 
Repeti- Semantic Semantic Semantic Semantic 
tions A:B::C:_ A:C::B:_ _:C::B:A _:B::C:A Mean 
1 4661 5529 5594 6156 5485 
2 3620 3891 3929 4223 3916 
3 2822 3078 2985 3263 3037 
4 2312 2584 2576 2772 2561 
Mean 3354 3770 3771 4104 
418 	BARNES AND WHITELY 
ANALOGY RESTRUCTURING 419 
Table 4 
Solution Accuracy Means for Repetitive 
Analogy Problem Solving 
Required Restructuring Processes 
No Perceptual 	Perceptual 
No 	 No 
Repeti- 
tions 
Semantic Semantic Semantic Semantic 
A:B::C:_ A:C::B:_ _:C::B:A _:B::C:A Mean 
1 3.02 2.07 2.69 2.06 2.46 
2 2.70 3.28 2.51 2.20 2.67 
3 2.27 2.76 3.20 3.15 2.85 
4 3.27 3.36 3.08 3.35 3.27 
Mean 2.82 2.87 2.87 2.69 
Note-Accuracy measure = Ln[P(correct)/P(error)J. 
F(3,92) = 8.26 (p < .001), and Semantic by Repetition, 
F(3,92) = 3.36 (p < .022). The two ill-structured anal-
ogies requiring a single restructuring transformation 
produced nearly identical response latency functions. 
For both interactions, the latency attributable to analogy 
restructuring diminished with repetition. Simple main 
effects tests for the first and last repetition intervals 
were computed. Both effects of problem restructuring 
were significant in both repetition intervals. At the first 
level of repetition, the F ratios were perceptual, F(1,30) 
= 44.73 (p < .001), and semantic, F(1,30) = 9.98 
(p < .004). At the fourth level of repetition, the F ratios 
were perceptual, F(1,30) = 4.68 (p < .039), and seman-
tic, F(1,30) = 12.76 (p < .001). 
As is evident in Table 3, the greatest facilitation of 
repetition was between the first and second intervals. 
Roughly, the amount of facilitation due to repetition 
halved with each additional solution. The constantly 
diminishing change in slope is indicative of a uniform 
facilitation effect, as opposed to a sudden strategy shift. 
Thus, repetitive analogy solving attenuated but did not 
eliminate analogy restructuring processes. No other 
factors were significant (all ps > .10). 
As in Experiment 1, the independence of perceptual 
and semantic analogy restructuring was determined. 
Thus, the two stages are additive portions of the overall 
solution time (Pachella, 1974). Figure 1 illustrates the 
additive nature of the analogy restructuring processes. 
Notice that the _:C: : B: A and the A : C: :B: _ means 
are nearly identical. Perhaps the two restructuring 
processes share similar elementary information processes 
(Newell & Simon, 1972) that are used to restructure the 
problem space and thus have equivalent durations. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Although the type of problem repetition varied across 
the two experiments, there were three main and con-
sistent results. First, both experiments supported the 
contention that ill-structured verbal analogies are 
restructured to a well-structured form in the course of  
problem solving. Ill-structured analogies requiring 
either perceptual or semantic analogy restructuring 
were solved slower than well-structured analogies that 
did not require analogy restructuring. 
Second, two qualitatively distinct analogy restruc-
turing stages were evoked by ill-structured analogies. 
The two restructuring processes were independent and 
differed on their accuracy and stage of execution. 
Latencies for perceptual and semantic analogy restruc-
turing processes did not interact in either experiment. 
In addition, semantically ill-structured analogies had 
higher error rates than semantically well-structured 
analogies in the first experiment, whereas perceptually 
ill-structured analogies were solved as accurately as 
perceptually well-structured analogies in both experi-
ments. Furthermore, the structure of the analogy was 
supported as influencing the execution sequence for 
problem restructuring and problem solving processes. 
In Experiment 1, significant latencies for perceptually 
restructuring an analogy were observable for the intact 
analogy and analogy stem tasks, but not for the analogy 
solution task. Presumably, perceptual restructuring 
processes were triggered by the position of the blank 
term in the stem. Significant latencies for semantic 
analogy restructuring processes were obtained in all 
three analogical tasks. Thus, semantic analogy ill-structure 
was perceived during stem representation and, more 
4 
Repetition of analogy solving 
Figure 1. Repetitive solution latencies for 
structured verbal analogies.  
likely, during and following alternative evaluation. 
While perceptual restructuring processes probably have 
a fixed trigger and are executed at the beginning of stem 
processing, semantic ill-structure is less rapidly and 
accurately perceived and semantic restructuring processes 
can be executed throughout the course of analogy 
solving. 
Third, analogy restructuring exhibited automaticity 
as the relationships in the problem solving space became 
reproductive and the solution steps became more algo-
rithmic. Repetition of analogy solving significantly 
reduced problem representation and solution time and 
increased accuracy for both experiments. Furthermore, 
repetition did not eliminate analogy restructuring pro-
cesses in either experiment. In the second experiment, 
perceptual and semantic restructuring processes inter-
acted with repetition of analogy solving. This interaction 
illustrated that the latency attributable to both analogy 
restructuring processes decreased with repetitive analogy 
solving but was not eliminated. Thus, the execution of 
analogy restructuring processes was facilitated. Pre-
sumably, an algorithm for solving ill-structured anal-
ogies was developed and refined with repetition of 
analogy solving. 
The results of both experiments indicate that 
current information processing models of analogical 
reasoning should be extended to incorporate both analogy 
restructuring processes for ill-structured analogies. 
Additionally, the restructuring processes and the other 
components of analogical reasoning may be fairly 
automatic. The remainder of the discussion will address 
these two issues. 
Problem Restructuring Processes and Models 
As mentioned previously, current models of ana-
logical reasoning have not addressed the issue of problem 
restructuring. For current models of analogical reason-
ing to be capable of problem restructuring, they must be 
extended to include restructuring components. Addi-
tionally, the sequence and nature of component execu-
tion must be specified. 
The proposed analogy restructuring extensions are 
applicable to current models of analogical reasoning. In 
the extended model, problem restructuring processes 
are evoked only for ill-structured analogies. Thus, both 
restructuring processes are optional and are performed 
only when ill-structure is perceived. Perceptual restruc-
turing during encoding is evoked by the presence of the 
blank stem term. Semantic restructuring processes are 
primarily evoked when the initial relationships of the 
analogy's domain are not applicable to the alternatives. 
Semantic restructuring processes could also be evoked 
after inference. This would occur when the A :C pair is 
strongly related and the A: B pair is not related or is 
less strongly related. 
In such an extended model, the _ :C: : B: A and the 
_ : B: :C: A analogies are perceptually restructured  
during encoding of the stem. The A: :B: :C:_ and the 
A :C: :B:_ analogies are encoded as perceptually 
well-structured analogies. The A:C: : B:_ and the 
_ :B: :C: A analogies are semantically restructured 
either during or, less frequently, prior to application. 
The A : B: :C:_ and the _:C: : B: A analogies are not 
semantically restructured. Thus, the extended model of 
analogical reasoning requires perceptual and semantic 
restructuring for various ill-structured analogies. Further 
research is needed to resolve issues about process execu-
tion sequences, especially for other ill-structured versions 
of analogies and for more difficult analogies. One 
criticism of experimental work on analogical reasoning 
is that only easy analogies have been investigated 
(Pellegrino & Lyons, 1979). Nevertheless, it is apparent 
that easy ill-structured analogies are restructured and 
that the sequence of solution steps differs with the type 
of initial analogy structure. 
Furthermore, the results of Experiment 1 tenta-
tively indicate that the incorporation of semantic 
analogy restructuring components might increase the fit 
between models of analogical reasoning and individual 
differences for analogies on aptitude tests, since psycho-
metric analogies are often ill-structured. Apprehension 
of problem ill-structure and the ability to restructure 
ill-structured problems may be important information 
processing abilities in regards to the linkage of informa-
tion processing models of cognition, theories of intelli-
gence, and intelligence assessment. 
Automaticity of Analogical Reasoning 
In the first experiment, three repetitions of verbal 
analogies failed to eliminate the effects for either analogy 
restructuring process for intact analogies. A solution 
recognition strategy was not adopted, even though 
subjects knew they had solved the same analogy twice 
before. Furthermore, repetition reduced response 
latency and increased accuracy in both experiments. In 
the second experiment, each analogy was solved four 
times, each in a different problem structure. In this way, 
the analogy's relationships, not its structure, were 
repeated. In the second experiment, as in the first, 
repetition attenuated but did not eliminate analogy 
restructuring effects. 
Because the nature of repetition varied across both 
experiments, the repetition effects are not directly 
comparable. However, the shape of the obtained facilita-
tion functions supports the contention that the analogy 
restructuring and the analogical processes executed 
after analogy restructuring were automatically executed. 
Otherwise, a strategy shift to solution recognition would 
have produced a marked flattening of the repetition 
function for intact analogies in both experiments. 
It is not surprising to obtain automaticity of problem 
restructuring for verbal analogies. Recall that verbal 
analogy problems tap basic and pervasive components 
of thinking. These components are the eduction, pro- 
well- and 
